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Towards a science education for all:
The role of ideas, evidence and argument
Abstract

Jonathan Osborne
King’s College, London
Jonathan Osborne holds the Chair of Science
Education at the Department for Educational
and Professional Studies, King’s College London
where he has been since 1985. Prior to that
he taught physics in high schools. Professor
Osborne is currently the head of department
and the President of the US National Association
for Research in Science Teaching (NARST). He
has conducted research in the area of primary
children’s understanding of science, attitudes to
science, informal learning, argumentation and
teaching the nature of science. He was a coeditor of the influential report Beyond 2000:
Science Education for the Future, winner of the
NARST award for best paper published in JRST
in 2003 and 2004, and is a co-PI on the National
Science Foundation funded Centre for Informal
Learning and Schools. A particular agenda for
his research is advancing the case for teaching
science for citizenship. To this end, he has
conducted a significant body of work exploring
the teaching of ideas, evidence and argument in
schools.

This presentation offers a critical
analysis of contemporary science
education and the values on which it
rests. Science education wrestles with
two competing priorities: the need
to educate the future citizen about
science; and the need to provide
the basic knowledge necessary for
future scientists. It is argued that the
evidence would suggest that it is the
latter goal that predominates – a goal
which exists at least, in part, in conflict
with the needs of the majority who
will not continue with science post
compulsory education. The argument is
advanced that there are four essential
elements to any science education
– the development of conceptual
understanding; the improvement of
cognitive reasoning; improving students’
understanding of the epistemic nature
of science; and affording an affective
experience that is both positive and
engaging. The decline in students’
interest in school science is, in part, due
to the emphasis on science for future
scientists. This presentation will aim to
show how a focus on ideas, evidence
and argument can offer an education
that is more appropriate to the needs
of the future citizen and the values of
contemporary youth.

Introduction
Curriculum innovations in science, such
as those sponsored by the Nuffield
Foundation in the UK and the National
Science Foundation in the USA in
the 1960s and 70s, have had little
impact on the practices of science
teachers (Cuban, 1990; Welch, 1979).
Four decades after Schwab’s (1962)
argument that science should be taught
as an ‘enquiry into enquiry’, and almost
a century since John Dewey (1916)
advocated that classroom learning be a
student-centred process of enquiry, we
still find ourselves struggling to achieve
such practices in the science classroom.

Witness the publication of the AAAS
edited volume on inquiry (Minstrell &
Van Zee, 2000), the release of Inquiry
and the National Science Education
Standards (National Research Council,
2000), and the inclusion of ‘scientific
enquiry’ as a separate strand in the
English and Welsh science national
curriculum. The latter, in particular,
has now been incorporated into
a more embracing program which
explores ‘How Science Works’ with
an eponymous title (Qualifications and
Curriculum Authority, 2005). These
developments serve as signposts to an
ideological commitment that teaching
science needs to accomplish much
more than simply detailing what we
know. In addition, there is a growing
recognition of the need to educate
our students and citizens about
how we know, and why we believe
in the scientific world view. While
acknowledging that the distinctive
feature of science is its ontology, the
argument will be presented that such
a shift requires a new focus on the
following: (1) how evidence is used
in science for the construction of
explanations; and (2), the development
of an understanding of the criteria used
in science to evaluate evidence. Central
to this perspective is a recognition
that language is not merely an adjunct
to science but a core constitutive
element (Norris & Phillips, 2003; J.F.
Osborne, 2002)). In particular, that the
construction of argument, and its critical
evaluation, are discursive activities
which are central to science and central
to the learning of science.
The starting point for this argument is
the recognition that science education
exists on the ‘horns of a dilemma’.
On the one hand, it wishes to pursue
the liberal notion of demonstrating
and communicating the best that is
worth knowing about this discipline.
In so doing, it seeks to lay before
the neophyte student the wondrous
achievements of science, showing that
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it has freed us from the shackles of
received wisdom, teaching a respect
for empirical evidence as the basis of
belief, and offering a vision of how new
knowledge can be created.
Yet, science’s dilemma (its second
horn) is that it can only function
effectively within a tradition where it is
taught as received knowledge (Kuhn,
1970) – knowledge that is unequivocal,
uncontested and unquestioned
(Claxton, 1991). Presented to the
young student in this manner, it is
perceived as a body of authoritative
knowledge which is to be accepted
and believed. This second perspective
is an inevitable product of a view that
sees the function of science education
as a propaedeutic training for the
next generation of scientists. The
fundamental flaw with this approach
is that, while the unity and salience of
such information is apparent to those
who hold an overview of the domain,
its significance is arcane for the young
student. Only for those who finally
enter the inner sanctum of the world
of the practising scientist will any sense
of coherence become apparent. As
a consequence, only those that ever
reach the end get to comprehend the
wonder and beauty of the edifice that
has been constructed.
More fundamentally, such an education
does harm to the future citizen (Irwin,
1995; Layton, Jenkins, McGill, & Davey,
1993) and limits the development
of the young person’s understanding
of the scientific enterprise. First, it
oversimplifies and misrepresents the
practices and processes of science,
providing an education which fails
to develop the skills and knowledge
necessary to understand or interpret
contemporary accounts of science,
scientists and their findings. And second,
its failure to develop any understanding
of the nature of science beyond naïve
empiricist notions (Driver, Leach, Millar,
& Scott, 1996), leaves the majority
poorly educated about science. Never

is there any recognition that students
have a right to what Arnold has called
the ‘best that is worth knowing’. Rather,
the outcome leaves many students
with an ambivalent or negative attitude
to science (Gardner, 1975; Osborne,
Simon, & Collins, 2003; Schibeci, 1984).
Yet, science education for all can only
ever be justified if it offers something of
universal value to all (Millar & Osborne,
2000). ‘Science for all’ requires a
‘science curriculum for all’ – one that
recognises the cultural significance
of science by offering insights to the
knowledge, practices and processes of
science. In essence, a science education
that pursues depth rather than breadth,
coherence rather than fragmentation, and
insight rather than mystification. In such
a curriculum, the study of the history of
ideas and the evidence on which they
are founded must lie at the core.

The goal of a science
curriculum for all
What kind of science curriculum might
then justify science’s compulsory status?
The starting point of the argument
to be presented begins with the view
that it is the developments of science
and technology which are most
likely to pose the political and moral
dilemmas for the generations to come
(Independent Editorial, 1999). The
question of how we address climate
change; whether we replace ageing
nuclear reactors; invest more heavily
in energy conservation; or how to
minimise the effects of flu pandemics
are just some of the examples that are
currently confronting contemporary
society. And, since answering such
questions makes demands on the finite
and precious resources available to a
given society, the public have a right to
part of the decision-making process. In
short, the case that only science should
decide what are the salient questions of
interest is unacceptable.

Yet confronted with the need to
engage a broader set of public(s)
in the debate, society is confronted
with a dilemma that the majority of
people lack the knowledge to make
an informed choice. What, then, does
it mean to offer a science education
that would contribute to enabling
young people to make good decisions
about issues associated with science
and technology? This presentation will
argue the view that science is one of
the greatest cultural achievements of
western society, if not the greatest. Any
education in science must attempt to
communicate, therefore, not only what
is worth knowing, but also how such
knowledge relates to other events, why
it is important, and how this particular
view of the world came to be. That
in short, as well as teaching what we
believe to be true in science, there is a
need to address why we believe it to
be true. It will be suggested that such
an approach provides a better balance
to the following goals of learning
science.
The conceptual: There is a body of
domain-specific knowledge which
is essential to any understanding of
science. At one level, this is simply a
knowledge of the entities that populate
the world – that is, what is meant by
a cell, an atom or an electric current.
Engaging with scientific concepts is
not possible unless individuals are
provided with the opportunities for
these concepts to be introduced,
and with time to learn their use and
how to interpret their meaning in an
appropriate context.
The epistemic and social practices of
science: If the rationality of science
is secured by a methodological
commitment to evidence as the
epistemic basis of belief, then surely the
careful consideration of the practices
that lead to secure and reliable
knowledge should be a core feature of
school science? An exploration of some
of science’s crowning achievements,
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even of such simple ideas as the
explanation of day and night, would
permit science teachers to show that
scientific knowledge was hard won –
the product of imaginative and creative
endeavour, derived often in the face
of fierce opposition. More importantly,
it would permit the science teacher
to show how science uses a range of
methods; the features that demarcate
science from non-science; the social
practices and values that both sustain
the scientific enterprise and lead to the
production of reliable knowledge; the
moral and ethical issues raised by the
application of scientific knowledge; and
to explore the relationship between
science and technology.
The cognitive: from a liberal perspective,
one of the goals of education is to
develop the autonomous individual
who is capable of making rational
decisions. It is, for instance, almost a
commonplace assumption of postEnlightenment ethics and political
theory that individual autonomy is a
necessary condition of human fulfilment
(Winch, 2006). In a society where
science and technology permeates its
foundational fabric, the ability to pursue
what might constitute a worthwhile
life is dependent on the ability to think
critically about science and technology.
Science education bears a responsibility
for providing experiences which both
maximise students’ cognitive potential
– the argument which underlies, for
instance, the CASE program (Adey &
Shayer, 1994) to accelerate cognition
through science education – and to
ensure that the experiences are offered
that require the practice and application
of critical thinking in science. Thus,
science education must show how
argument and its evaluation – in short,
critical thinking – is a core feature of
science.
Perhaps a more fundamental reason
for the inclusion of this element is its
value as a pedagogic heuristic. The
case for the inclusion of argumentation

as a form of pedagogy comes from
the increasing evidence that learning
to argue is learning to think (Billig,
1996), and from the increasing
empirical evidence emerging from
the work of social psychologists that
the knowledge and understanding of
school-age children can be facilitated by
collaborative work between peers.
The affective and social: the education of
young people in science should afford
experiences that generate inspiration
at the achievement of their scientific
culture. Thus, while being challenging,
it must offer ‘feelings of understanding’
and fascination at what it has to offer.
Such elements are crucial to motivation
and enduring engagement. In addition,
science like any other subject must
recognise the growing body of evidence
(Daniels, 2001; Doise & Mugny, 1984;
Rogoff, 1998) that suggests that learning
is best facilitated through a process
of social interactions and discourse
where children are offered structured
experiences that engage them in their
zone of proximal development. Such
experiences not only teach them how
to reason, but also how to listen,
how to evaluate the arguments of
others, and how to construct counterarguments – skills that are essential for
life as an adult in general.
If an education for citizenship is to be
the primary focus of formal science
education – the central question
is: what is the appropriate mix of
these elements? The argument will
be developed that the four pillars of
such an education are a knowledge
of scientific ‘facts’; an understanding of
the methods and process of science;
an awareness of the context and
interests of the various actors; and an
ability to analyse the risk and benefits
of developments in science and
technology.
Drawing on a wide body of research,
this paper will argue that a focus
on examining ideas, evidence and

argumentation has the potential to
(a) improve students’ conceptual
understanding of science; (b) enhance
their ability to reason and think critically;
(c) develop a deeper understanding
of the nature of belief in science; and
(d) to make the quality of the learning
environment and learning experience
more enjoyable.
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